

BEARING SILENT WITNESS: A GRANDFATHER'S SECRET ATTESTATION TO GERMAN WAR CRIMES IN OCCUPIED FRANCE

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Abstract

Scholars have acknowledged that the study of World War II era intelligence can be an extremely arduous undertaking. Intelligence tradecraft, by its very nature, requires that certain information remain secret. It necessitates the sustained concealment of activities or events. Moreover, this government emphasis on secrecy often results in the suppression of sensitive information from historians and citizens alike. Thus, one must turn to declassified records of the past to reshape modern conceptions of history. This article should be regarded as a spirited departure from traditional scholarship. Specifically, it utilizes the case study method to communicate a powerful message related to both law and history. Readers are encouraged to examine this narrative and related analysis in conjunction with the primary source material it references. More importantly, they are asked to apply a socio-legal approach to the personal account contained therein. In the summer of 2011, the author was fortunate to discover a declassified report detailing his grandfather's experiences as a young airman in World War II. Lt. Raymond Murphy was shot down in 1944 by German anti-aircraft fire on his sixteenth mission as a B-17 Navigator with the U.S. Army Air Corps. When examined from a legal perspective, his report is illustrative of a number of law of war topics, including the foundational principles that gave rise to modern humanitarian law. Unfortunately, Lt. Murphy's account also evidences something far more disturbing, a criminal atrocity committed by German forces against the French population.

Keywords: World War II, Eighth Air Force, Army Air Corps, declassified intelligence, socio-legal analysis, escape and evasion, law of war, humanitarian law, Hague IV, Martens Clause, military necessity, kriegsraison, Maquis, French Resistance

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RAYMOND JOSEPH MURPHY
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Over half a century after the Nazi era, the U.S. Government continues to keep secret much of the information it has on Nazi war criminals. It is imperative that this information receive full scrutiny by the public. Only through an informed understanding of the Nazi era and its aftermath can we guard against a repeat of one of the darkest moments in history.²

Rep. Stephen Horn, July 1998

Introduction

The Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act of 1998 required the U.S. Government to expedite the release of classified intelligence information related to German war crimes committed during World War II.³ In an effort to fulfill this mandate, an interagency working group was called upon to 'locate, identify, recommend for declassification, and make available to the public at the National Archives and Records Administration, all classified Nazi war criminal records of the United States.'⁴ This working group would ultimately release over 8.5 million pages from documents 'scattered among the vast quantities of files stored in the national archives and individual federal agencies.'⁵ As a result, this project would come to be regarded as the 'largest congressionally mandated declassification effort in history.'⁶ Although members of Congress were successful in initiating an unprecedented release of information,⁷ their efforts are notable for another reason as well - America's lawmakers failed to allocate funds for the continued research and preservation of this material.⁸ Rather, they left this substantial responsibility to inquisitive historians and members of the general public.⁹

² Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act: Hearing on H.R. 4007 and S. 1379 Before the Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and Technology of the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, *Statement of Representative Stephen Horn, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and Technology* (105th Congress, 1998) p.1.

³ Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act 1998 codified as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 522 note.

⁴ Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act § 2(c)(1). See also Nazi War Criminal Records Interagency Working Group, *Implementation of Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act: An Interim Report to Congress* (1999).

⁵ Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, *Final Report to Congress* (2007) pp.1 and 5.

⁶ Working Group, *Final Report* pp.xv and 1.

⁷ *Statement of Rep. Stephen Horn* p.1 describing congressional intent behind the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act of 1998.

⁸ Implementation of the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and Technology of the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, *Statement of Dr. Michael Katz, Assistant Archivist of the United States National Archives and Records Administration* (106th Congress, 2000).

⁹ *Statement of Dr. Katz* p.15. See also *Final Report* pp.1-2 clarifying that agency participants did not receive independent funding for the prolonged study of these documents - rather, their mandate was to release these records to the general public.

Scholars have acknowledged that the study of World War II era intelligence can be an extremely arduous undertaking.¹⁰ Intelligence tradecraft, by its very nature, requires that certain information remain secret.¹¹ It necessitates the sustained concealment of activities and events.¹² Moreover, this government emphasis on secrecy often results in the suppression of sensitive information from historians and citizens alike.¹³ Thus, it has 'become a tradition in intelligence scholarship to look to the declassified records of the past for enlightenment.'¹⁴ This trend has led multiple historians to conclude that 'there are remarkable fragments of the story which have lain undiscovered in improbable places for more than fifty years.'¹⁵ Consequently, those choosing to carry out archival research 'will undoubtedly find their own discoveries in these declassified documents and in related records of the National Archives.'¹⁶

This article should be regarded as a spirited departure from traditional legal scholarship. It endeavours to be a 'largely empirical contribution to the start of a wider project'¹⁷ - namely, one that examines fragments of declassified intelligence and attempts to place this information into a larger mosaic of historical events.¹⁸ The following discussion utilizes the case study method to communicate a powerful message related to both law and history. Readers are encouraged to examine this narrative and related analysis in conjunction with the primary source material it references. More importantly, they are asked to evaluate relevant provisions of international law and to apply these principles to a specific declassified report. It is through a similar process that this article arrives at its central conclusion.

¹⁰ Richard Breitman et al., *U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis* (Cambridge University Press, 2005) p.8; Richard Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand: Britain, American, and Cold War Secret Intelligence* (The Overlook Press, 2001) p.16.

¹¹ Mark Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy* (CQ Press, 2009) p.1; John Radsan, 'The Unresolved Equation of Espionage and International Law,' *Michigan Journal of International Law*, 28 (2007) 595-623, pp.599-602.

¹² See Lowenthal, *Intelligence* p.1.

¹³ Lowenthal, *Intelligence* p.1 explaining that secrecy can be a source of consternation to private citizens, especially in a democratic society such as the United States.

¹⁴ Lorie Charlesworth, '2 SAS Regiment, War Crimes Investigations, and British Intelligence: Intelligence Officials and the Natzweiler Trial,' *Journal of Intelligence History*, 6 (2006) 13-60, p.21.

¹⁵ Aldrich, *Hidden Hand* p.15. See also Breitman, *U.S. Intelligence* p.8; Michael Salter, *Nazi War Crimes, U.S. Intelligence and Selective Prosecution at Nuremberg: Controversies Regarding the Role of the Office of Strategic Services* (Taylor & Francis, 2007) pp.2-3.

¹⁶ Breitman, *U.S. Intelligence* p.8.

¹⁷ Salter, *Nazi War Crimes* p.4.

¹⁸ Aldrich, *Hidden Hand* pp.15-16 discussing the inherent difficulty in researching events that are recorded in documents scattered across various archival collections. See also Charlesworth, '2 SAS,' p.21 comparing the study of declassified intelligence to assembling a larger mosaic of historical information.

1 Background

There is little doubt that memory is an essential concept for historians.¹⁹ In their search for ‘the “truth” of remembered account’, scholars often turn to the case study method to ‘record and value’ historical events.²⁰ In his recent work related to postwar intelligence, Michael Salter emphasizes the importance of the case study in placing declassified intelligence into its broader historical context.²¹ Specifically, he suggests that ‘detailed case studies can be as revealing of wider historical and institutional tendencies as apparently broader sociological approaches that seek to capture and generalize about the entire field.’²² As Salter’s viewpoints have gained acceptance amongst prominent academic circles, a new legal sub-discipline has started to emerge.

Socio-legal analysis is described as a ‘fluid, changing, open movement [that] defies a fixed descriptor’.²³ At its core, however, this approach focuses on the intersection of law, intelligence, and human rights.²⁴ Proponents of this movement stress that it explores historical events ‘from the perspective of the various participants, emphasizing their “lived experience.”’²⁵ As a result, some scholars have asserted that this legal sub-discipline ‘encourages the voice of the historian to be heard directly in the text’, thereby making remembered account an integral piece of the ensuing narrative.²⁶ Thus, readers should be aware that throughout the remainder of this article, ‘the authorial voice, my voice, disrupts this narrative... to allow other interpretations to emerge and to sabotage illusions of closure.’²⁷ This was done deliberately and in an effort to familiarize the audience with the case study that follows.

¹⁹ Lorie Charlesworth, ‘Forgotten Justice: Forgetting Law’s History and Victim’s Justice in British “Minor” War Crimes Trials 1945-48,’ *Amicus Curiae*, 74 (2008) 2-10, p.2.

²⁰ Charlesworth, ‘Forgotten Justice,’ p.4.

²¹ Salter, *Nazi War Crimes* p.3. See also Michael Salter, ‘Intelligence Agencies and War Crimes Prosecution: Allen Dulles’s Involvement in Witness Testimony at Nuremberg,’ *Journal of International Criminal Justice*, 2 (2004) 826-854, p.826 describing CIA Director Allen Dulles’s involvement in the Nuremberg proceedings; Michael Salter, ‘Trial by Media: The Psychological Warfare Background to OSS’s Contribution to the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials,’ *Journal of Intelligence History*, 9 (2010) 15-51, p.15 analyzing the role of the Office of Strategic Services in the Nuremberg proceedings; Michael Salter et al., ‘War Crimes Prosecutors and Intelligence Agencies: The Case for Assessing their Collaboration,’ *Intelligence and National Security*, 16 (2001) 93-120, p.93 providing additional discussion of the involvement of intelligence agencies in monitoring war criminality.

²² Salter, *Nazi War Crimes* p.3.

²³ Charlesworth, ‘Forgotten Justice,’ p.3.

²⁴ See Charlesworth, ‘Forgotten Justice,’ p.3 referencing socio-legal studies in the context of Salter’s emphasis on intelligence studies and humanitarian scholarship.

²⁵ Charlesworth, ‘Forgotten Justice,’ p.3.

²⁶ Charlesworth, ‘Forgotten Justice,’ p.4.

²⁷ Charlesworth, ‘Forgotten Justice,’ p.4.

In the summer of 2011, through hard work and a bit of luck, my father and I were able to learn more about the man who made our very existence possible, Lt. Raymond Murphy. The task of locating my grandfather was complicated by a number of factors, not the least of which was his misrepresenting his age by one year to join the U.S. Army Air Corps in 1942. In addition, my father never met his birth father and knew few particulars of the man's life. Although my grandfather passed away in 1970 at the age of 46, we were fortunate to discover a series of documents detailing his experiences during World War II.²⁸ Moreover, our journey led us to his final resting place at Arlington National Cemetery.

Although the details that led to this discovery are certainly noteworthy, this article seeks to examine something much more significant - the story my grandfather was able to share with us nearly 40 years after his death. On 28 April 1944, Lt. Murphy was shot down by German anti-aircraft fire over Avord, France on his sixteenth mission as a B-17 Navigator with the 91st Bomb Group, 324th Squadron.²⁹ For the next three months, he successfully evaded German patrols and Nazi collaborators with the help of local French Resistance fighters known as *le Maquis*.³⁰

Following his escape in August of 1944, my grandfather was questioned by the U.S. Army Military Intelligence Service at Headquarters, European Theater of Operations.³¹ The information he provided during his debriefing was recorded in narrative form and analysed for intelligence related to the continued presence of German forces in occupied France. At the conclusion of his interview, my grandfather signed a security certificate forbidding him from

²⁸ The information in this article is primarily drawn from Missing Air Crew Report (*MACR*) No. 4235 and Escape and Evasion Report (*E&E*) No. 866. During World War II, U.S. Army Air Corps Bomb Groups were required to submit MACRs when airmen were lost during combat operations. E&E Reports were required when personnel subsequently avoided capture by enemy forces. Notably, the National Archives and Records Administration recently made E&E reports publicly available in electronic format. Thus, the primary source material contained in *MACR* No. 4235 and *E&E* No. 866 should be examined in conjunction with this article. Please see relevant citations and associated hyperlinks to access publicly available versions of these documents.

²⁹ See generally *Escape and Evasion Report No. 866, Evasion in France* (15 Aug 1944), http://media.nara.gov/nw/305270/EE-866.pdf?bcsi_scan_0F6519961A220080=0&bcsi_scan_filename=EE-866.pdf.

³⁰ *E&E* No. 866, pp.1-23. See also Julian Jackson, *France: The Dark Years 1940-1944* (Oxford University Press, 2001); Claude Chambard, *The Maquis: A History of the French Resistance Movement* (Macmillan General Reference, 1976) providing a more thorough discussion of French Resistance efforts and the structure of *le Maquis* generally.

³¹ *E&E* No. 866, p.1. See also Charlesworth, '2 SAS Regiment,' p.13 demonstrating that intelligence collection played a critical role in post-War proceedings such as the Nuremberg Trials and other minor war crimes trials.

disclosing any facts related to his wartime experience.³² The resulting report was marked 'SECRET' and titled *Escape and Evasion Report No. 866, Evasion in France*.³³ Only recently has this document been made available to the public in electronic format.³⁴

Although my father and I will never be able to sit down with Lt. Murphy and discuss his story, his words are compelling even 40 years after his death. As a scholar of intelligence law and history, I was struck by the significance of his experiences in the summer of 1944. When examined from a legal perspective, his declassified first person account is illustrative of a number of law of war topics, including the law related to land and aerial warfare, escape and evasion, and the duties owed to inhabitants during belligerent occupation. Most notably, however, my grandfather's report also evidences criminal atrocities committed by German soldiers.

The story told by Lt. Murphy is one of great valor and sacrifice. Accordingly, this article will attempt to honour his memory while also providing a thorough legal analysis of the conduct that he witnessed. The following discussion will examine his experiences in the context of the law of war as it existed in 1944. It will also provide a modern perspective of how this body of law has evolved since World War II. In addition, this article will examine a particularly disturbing recollection reported by my grandfather to military intelligence officers and attempt to answer one important question - could the terrible event described in *Escape and Evasion Report No. 866* constitute evidence of a long-forgotten war crime?³⁵

³² *E&E No. 866*, p.21.

³³ *E&E No. 866*, p.21. According to the National Archives, E&E Reports were developed to collect and evaluate data on escape and evasion activities in the European Theater of Operations. They included a brief questionnaire as well as a typed or handwritten narrative provided by the escapee or evader. Notably, these reports were not intended to collect information on war crimes or other criminal acts perpetrated by enemy forces.

³⁴ National Archives, *NARAtions: The Blog of the United States National Archives, World War II Escape and Evasion Reports Are Now Available Online* (14 Sept 2010), <http://blogs.archives.gov/online-public-access/?p=2751> stating that digitized versions of Escape and Evasion Reports first became available on NARA's website in September 2010; see also National Archives, *Prologue: Pieces of History*, <http://blogs.archives.gov/prologue/?p=1798>.

³⁵ See Leslie C. Green, *The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict* (Juris Publishing, 2008) pp.50 and 320; Salter, *Nazi War Crimes* p.6 illustrating that under Article 6 of the London Charter of 1945, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg was given jurisdiction over crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity - although crimes against peace and humanity had never been previously defined under international law, these terms were given broad application under these proceedings.

2 The Law of War in Historical Perspective

In order to analyse Lt. Murphy's account, it is first necessary to provide some context to the war as it existed in the skies over Europe during this period. The experiences of my grandfather and the crew of his B-17 were in no way unique or exceptional. Rather, all airmen in the U.S. Eighth Air Force, or the Mighty Eighth as it was often referred to, took part in fierce aerial combat in the period leading up to the summer of 1944.³⁶ One aircrew in particular, the crew of the Memphis Belle, made my grandfather's squadron famous when they were the first to successfully complete 25 missions and return to America as celebrated heroes.³⁷

The air war had raged in Europe 'for two years by the time elements of the Eighth Air Force began to arrive in late 1942 and deploy across the misty English countryside.'³⁸ As the conflict wound on, the air war 'kept on creating and re-creating itself in a furious upward curve, attackers and defenders alike improvising tactics on a round-the-clock basis, ransacking science and engineering for new technology, any kind of edge - new bomber specs and new fighter-plane wrinkles... ever-higher ranges in anti-aircraft fire'.³⁹ In addition, the Eighth Air Force's mission in Europe was made all the more deadly by one major factor - daytime bombing missions.⁴⁰

The American forces had committed themselves to daylight bombing, against the advice of their British counterparts, who considered it suicidal and had long since switched to nighttime bombing. The Eighth still held to the theory that a tight formation or a combat box, of B-17 Flying Fortresses, each bristling with guns, was capable of defending itself from enemy fighter aircraft. And the Eighth was finding that this was a mistake.⁴¹

The losses suffered by the Eighth Air Force were staggering. During the European Campaign, more than 30,000 U.S. airmen were killed or missing and another 30,000 were captured as

³⁶ Roger Freeman, *The Mighty Eighth: A History of the Units, Men, and Machines of the US Eighth Air Force* (Doubleday, 1970); Marion Havelaar, *The 91st Bombardment Group in World War II* (Schiffer, 1995). See also Rob Morris, *Untold Valor: Forgotten Stories of American Bomber Crews in World War II* (Potomac Books, 2006) detailing personal accounts of airmen from the 8th Air Force during World War II.

³⁷ Robert Morgan et al., *The Man Who Flew the Memphis Belle: Memoir of a World War II Bomber Pilot* (Dutton, 2001).

³⁸ Morgan, *Memphis Belle* p.102. See also Havelaar, *91st Bomb Group* p.9 describing the arrival and deployment of the 8th Air Force in 1942.

³⁹ Morgan, *Memphis Belle* p.102.

⁴⁰ See John Keegan, *The Second World War* (Penguin Books, 1989) pp.425-26; see also David Metz, *The Air Campaign: John Warden and the Classical Air Power Theorists* (University Press of the Pacific, 2005) p.39 describing daylight bombing and the theoretical underpinnings for this wartime practice.

⁴¹ Morris, *Untold Valor* p.54.

prisoners of war.⁴² Overall, the Eighth Air Force 'took more casualties in World War II than the Marine Corps and the Navy combined.'⁴³ Of the 36 bombers that had originally crossed the Atlantic to form the 91st Bomb Group, 'twenty-nine had been shot down, a casualty rate of 82 per cent.'⁴⁴

As a result of the alarming rate of casualties, many survivors were troubled by the memories of friends and acquaintances who, just the day before, had been drinking next to them in a pub in England.⁴⁵ Although some men chose to talk openly about their experiences, others suffered in silence.⁴⁶ All airmen, however, speculated about what happened to those who were able to escape their crippled aircraft and survive their rapid descent to German occupied territory.⁴⁷ Robert Morgan, the pilot of the *Memphis Belle*, reflected on these men when he wrote:

We knew every time we went up, that it was very possible, likely even, to get hit hard, maybe knocked out of the sky. We might get trapped and roasted at our stations, or riddled with flak or machine gun bullets, or captured and sent to prison camps if we bailed out, provided we survived the trip down.⁴⁸

From 25,000 feet, the conflict below may have seemed somewhat impersonal or distant at times. When an airman found himself in the unfortunate situation of being shot down, however, the deadly reality of the situation quickly became apparent.⁴⁹ Rather than returning to base to enjoy a hot meal and shower, men like Lt. Murphy and his crew members were forced to come face to face with the ground truth of land warfare.

⁴² Morgan, *Memphis Belle* p.106. See also Freeman, *Mighty Eighth* p.35; Havelaar, *91st Bomb Group* p.35 providing more specific casualty reporting for the 8th Air Force and 91st Bomb Group.

⁴³ Morgan, *Memphis Belle* p.106.

⁴⁴ Morgan, *Memphis Belle* p.132.

⁴⁵ Morgan, *Memphis Belle* p.132-33; see also Travis Ayres, *The Bomber Boys: Heroes Who Flew the B-17s in World War II* (NAL Caliber, 2005); Bert Stiles, *Serenade to the Big Bird* (Schiffer, 2001) p.69 detailing personal accounts of airmen who served in World War II.

⁴⁶ Morgan, *Memphis Belle* p.133.

⁴⁷ See Kay Sloan, *Not Without Honor: The Nazi Journal of Steve Carano* (University of Arkansas Press, 2008) p.129 providing Bill Blackmon's personal account of the events of 28 April 1944 — notably, Blackmon spent months in German captivity after his B-17 was shot down during the bombing run on Avord, France. See also Stuart Hadaway, *Missing Believed Killed: Casualty Policy and the Missing Research Service and Enquiry Service 1939-1952* (Pen and Sword, 2008) describing the search for missing Allied airmen in Europe.

⁴⁸ Morgan, *Memphis Belle* p.165.

⁴⁹ Sloan, *Not Without Honor* p.136. See also Thomas Childers, *In the Shadows of War: An American Pilot's Odyssey through Occupied France and the Camps of Nazi Germany* (Henry Holt and Company, 2002).

In 1944, the law of land warfare was primarily regulated by the 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV).⁵⁰ The precursor to Hague IV was the 1899 Hague Convention II (Hague II).⁵¹ Although Hague II represented the ‘first successful effort of the international community to codify a relatively comprehensive regime governing the laws of land warfare’,⁵² the treaty provisions agreed upon by the parties to Hague IV are still in force today.⁵³

Parties to both Hague II and Hague IV laid the foundation for what would become known as *jus in bello*, or ‘the laws and customs of war’.⁵⁴ Notably, the Preamble to Hague IV also gave expression to certain ‘high ideals’ which formed the basis for modern humanitarian law.⁵⁵ The Preamble reads in part:

Animated by the desire to serve, even in this extreme case, the interests of humanity and the ever progressive needs of civilization; [t]hinking it important, with this object, to revise the general laws and customs of war... the high contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included by the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience.⁵⁶

This section of Hague IV, which would come to be known as the Martens Clause, makes a clear distinction between the ‘laws’ versus the ‘customs’ of war.⁵⁷ Thus, while Hague IV represented a

⁵⁰ See Michael Schmitt, ‘Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance,’ *Virginia Journal of International Law*, 50 (2010) 795-839, pp.795, 800, and 806; Chris Jochnick et al., ‘The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical History of the Laws of War,’ *Harvard Journal of International Law*, 35 (1994) 49-97, pp.49 and 52.

⁵¹ See Adam Roberts et al., *Documents on the Laws of War* (Oxford University Press, 2000) pp.67 and 68. See also Kevin Chamberlain, *War and Cultural Heritage* (Institute of Art and Law, 2004) p.9.

⁵² Green, *Law of Armed Conflict* p.41.

⁵³ Fritz Kalshoven et al., *Constraints on the Waging of War: An Introduction to International Humanitarian Law* (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2001) p.23.

⁵⁴ Green, *Law of Armed Conflict* p.22. See also Robert Sloane, ‘The Cost of Conflation: Preserving the Dualism of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in the Contemporary Law of War,’ *Yale Journal of International Law*, 34 (2009) 47-112, pp.47 and 49; Carsten Stahn, ‘“Jus ad bellum”, “jus in bello” . . . “jus post bellum”? – Rethinking the Conception of Law of Armed Force,’ *European Journal of International Law*, 17 (2006) 921-943, pp.921 and 925.

⁵⁵ Green, *Law of Armed Conflict* p.22 and 23.

⁵⁶ Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV) (18 Oct 1907) Preamble.

⁵⁷ Roberts et al., *Documents on the Laws of War* p.68. See also Theodor Meron, ‘The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity, and Dictates of Public Conscience,’ *American Journal of International Law*, 94 (2000) 78-89, pp.78 and 79; William Downey, ‘The Law of War and Military Necessity,’ *American Journal of International Law*, 47 (1953) pp.251-262.

'relatively comprehensive agreement on the law of land warfare',⁵⁸ its provisions were not intended to be inclusive of all applicable law. Rather, the Martens Clause proscribes that 'cases not included in the Regulations annexed to the Convention remain governed by customary international law relating to the conduct of warfare.'⁵⁹ Consequently, this principle would be resoundingly reaffirmed in the 1949 Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners (GPW), the 1949 Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War (GC IV), and the 1977 Geneva Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (AP I).⁶⁰

The 'Geneva Law', as this postwar collective is sometimes referred to, dictates that the principles of humanitarian law are applicable to any conflict, even if a nation has clearly denounced the Conventions.⁶¹ Thus, Hague IV, which regulated land warfare during World War II, contained many of the fundamental precepts for modern international agreements.⁶² In effect, the Geneva Law 'complemented and supplemented' these already existing legal norms.⁶³ German officials, however, had a much different interpretation of the duties owed under Hague IV in the build-up to World War II.⁶⁴ Although Germany signed and ratified the annexed Regulations, they maintained a specific reservation to Article 44.⁶⁵

Germany's reservation to Hague IV should have served as a forewarning of events to come. Specifically, Article 44 states that a 'belligerent is forbidden to force the inhabitants of territory occupied by it to furnish information about the army of the other belligerent, or about its means of self-defense.'⁶⁶ Thus, Germany's reservation to Hague IV could be viewed as evidence of the

⁵⁸ Roberts et al., *Documents on the Laws of War* p.68. See also Schmitt, 'Military Necessity,' p.797.

⁵⁹ Roberts et al., *Documents on the Laws of War* p.68.

⁶⁰ Roberts et al., *Documents on the Laws of War* p.68. See also Rupert Ticehurst, 'The Martens Clause and the Laws of Armed Conflict,' *International Review of the Red Cross*, 317 (1997) pp.125-134.

⁶¹ See Kalshoven, 'Constraints,' pp.53-54; see also Green, *Law of Armed Conflict* p.23.

⁶² Roberts et al., *Documents on the Laws of War* p.68. See also Schmitt, 'Military Necessity,' pp.807-811 explaining the evolution of the law of war.

⁶³ Roberts et al., *Documents on the Laws of War* p.68.

⁶⁴ See *The War Book of the German General Staff* (McBride, Nast & Company, 1915), http://books.google.com/books?id=j3kDAAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepag&q&f=false providing a pre-World War II translation of the German War Manual. See also James Garner, 'The German War Code,' *University of Illinois Bulletin*, 15 (1918) pp.1, 9-10, and 20 containing a complimentary analysis of the doctrine of *Kriegsraison* and its relation to Hague IV.

⁶⁵ See Roberts et al., *Documents on the Laws of War* p.84. Germany signed the annexed Regulations of Hague IV on 18 October 1907 and subsequently ratified these provisions on 27 November 1909. At the time of signature they made note of their specific reservation and maintained this reservation until ratification, as did Austria-Hungary, Japan, Montenegro, and Russia.

⁶⁶ Hague IV, art. 44.

country's intention to not only invade neighbouring territory, but also gather information on a country's military defences by forcing local inhabitants into collaboration.⁶⁷ These facts become even more troubling when coupled with the doctrine of *Kriegsraison geht vor Kriegsrecht*, or as it is more commonly referred to, *Kriegsraison*.⁶⁸

Kriegsraison is a concept that first appeared in German literature in the late eighteenth century.⁶⁹ The literal translation of this term is 'military necessity in war overrides the law of war.'⁷⁰ Accordingly, German proponents of the doctrine believed that 'military necessity... renders inoperative ordinary law and the customs and usages of war',⁷¹ Interestingly, this belief starkly contrasts with the contemporary law of war framework which recognizes that 'necessity cannot overrule the law of war'.⁷² In fact, modern U.S. Army doctrine explains that 'military necessity has been generally rejected as a defense for acts forbidden by the customary and conventional laws of war'.⁷³ Of particular note, relevant law and custom are binding 'not only upon states... but also upon individuals, and in particular, the members of their armed forces.'⁷⁴

Although *Kriegsraison* was overwhelmingly repudiated by the international community in the years following World War II, the facts and circumstances in *Escape and Evasion Report No. 866* strongly suggest that this doctrine was thriving amongst German forces in war-torn

⁶⁷ Garner, 'German War Code,' pp.10 and 20.

⁶⁸ Scott Horton, 'Kriegsraison or Military Necessity? The Bush Administration's Wilhelmine Attitude Towards the Conduct of War,' *Fordham International Law Journal*, 30 (2006) 576-598, pp.576 and 585-87. For a more detailed discussion of the doctrine, see also Gary D. Solis, *The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law* (2010) p.266. Solis writes that '*Kriegsmanier* was the conduct of war according to the customs and laws of war; *Kriegsraison*, its opposite, was the non-observation of those customs and laws.' He further asserts that while *Kriegsraison* was embraced by some German politicians and military officers, 'it is probable that the resort to this doctrine was above all based on contempt for the law.'

⁶⁹ Solis, *International Humanitarian Law* p.266. See also Garner, 'German War Code,' p.11.

⁷⁰ Solis, *International Humanitarian Law* p.265. See also *War Book* p.68. Notably, this German manual on land warfare states that:

A war conducted without energy cannot be directed merely against the combatants of the Enemy State and the positions they occupy, but it will and must in like manner seek to destroy the total intellectual and material resources of the latter. Humanitarian claims such as the protection of men and their goods can only be taken into consideration in so far as the nature and object of the war permit.

⁷¹ Solis, *International Humanitarian Law* p.266 citing Louis Doswald Beck, 'International Humanitarian Law and the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons,' *International Review of the Red Cross*, 316 (1997) 1-63, p.33.

⁷² Solis, *International Humanitarian Law* p.265.

⁷³ Department of the Army, *The Law of Land Warfare, Field Manual 27-10* (1956) Appendix A-1. See also *Judge Advocate General's School: Law of War Handbook* (2005) pp.164-65.

⁷⁴ Department of the Army, *Law of Land Warfare*, Appendix A-1.

France.⁷⁵ While *Kriegsraison* allows a belligerent to violate rules of international law it deems ‘necessary for the success of its military operations’,⁷⁶ the underlying reasoning for this viewpoint is fundamentally flawed.⁷⁷ As German forces in World War II were the sole judge of what constituted military necessity, the ‘doctrine [was] really that a belligerent may violate the law or repudiate it or ignore it whenever [it was] deemed to be for its military advantage.’⁷⁸ Thus, *Kriegsraison* had no basis in fundamental principles of international law, but rather relied on a practitioner’s self-serving motivations and an innate ‘contempt’ for the established law of war.⁷⁹

3 The First to Leave the Ship

At 1154 hours on 28 April 1944, two airmen in accompanying B-17s observed my grandfather’s aircraft leave formation with its ‘No. 3 engine on fire’.⁸⁰ The weather conditions for the mission over Avord, France were relatively clear with only ‘slight ground haze... [and] scattered clouds.’⁸¹ Although this enabled the heavy bombers a great deal of visibility over their target, it also allowed German forces below to more effectively direct their anti-aircraft fire during this dangerous daytime mission. The first witness to the incident remembered seeing nine parachutes before his vision was obstructed by other planes in the formation.⁸² The second witness saw all 10 airmen bail out of the crippled aircraft before it exploded in mid-air.⁸³

My grandfather reported that his B-17 was ‘in pretty bad shape’ after receiving a direct hit immediately over its target.⁸⁴ He had been wounded in both hands by exploding flak and observed a substantial amount of ‘fire on [the] wing’.⁸⁵ The gas tank between the No. 3 and No. 4 engine was in flames,⁸⁶ which left the crew with little time to escape. My grandfather ‘was the

⁷⁵ See Downey, ‘Law of War and Military Necessity,’ p.253 discussing the doctrine of *Kriegsraison* and its application in World War II; see also Norman Dunbar, ‘Military Necessity in War Crimes Trials,’ *British Yearbook of International Law*, 29 (1952) pp.441 and 446-467.

⁷⁶ Solis, *International Humanitarian Law* p.267.

⁷⁷ Horton, ‘Kriegsraison or Military Necessity,’ p.586; see also Schmitt, ‘Military Necessity,’ pp.797-99.

⁷⁸ Solis, *International Humanitarian Law* p.267 citing Claud Mullins, *The Liepzig Trial: An Account of the War Criminals’ Trials and a Study of German Mentality* (H. F. & G. Witherby, 1921) p.123.

⁷⁹ Solis, *International Humanitarian Law* p.26; see also Jochnick et al., ‘Legitimation of Violence,’ pp.63-64.

⁸⁰ See Missing Air Crew Report (MACR) No. 4235 (2 May 1944) p.3, <http://heroesoffreedom.nl/42-97199.pdf>; see also Havelaar, *91st Bomb Group* p.118.

⁸¹ MACR No. 4235, p.2.

⁸² MACR No. 4235, p.3.

⁸³ MACR No. 4235, p.3.

⁸⁴ E&E No. 866, p.12.

⁸⁵ E&E No. 866, p.12.

⁸⁶ E&E No. 866, p.12. See also Havelaar, *91st Bomb Group* p.188.

first to leave the ship' and jumped from an altitude of approximately 15,000 feet.⁸⁷ He delayed opening his parachute to avoid German flak and machine gun fire.⁸⁸ Unfortunately, he waited too long and the resulting impact knocked him unconscious and fractured his back.⁸⁹ Shortly thereafter, local Frenchmen picked him up and carried him into the woods where they gave him some 'wine and a woodman's jacket' and 'helped [him] the best they could.'⁹⁰

Although the pilot, Lt. James Cater, also escaped the crippled B-17, his exit from the nose hatch at 15,000 feet was less than ideal.⁹¹ He jumped with his hand on the ripcord, and accidentally released his parachute while he was 'still in the prop wash.'⁹² In all, Lt. Cater hung from his parachute harness, exposed to exploding flak, for nearly 18 minutes.⁹³ During the final stage of his descent, he observed German 'machine gun fire from the ground, directed at [him] and the other men.'⁹⁴ Although he landed unharmed, he reported that other downed airmen were not so lucky. Lt. Cater recounted that 'two men were said to be shot by German machine gun fire' while trapped in their harnesses.⁹⁵

When interviewed by military intelligence officers after his escape, my grandfather was unsure of the fate of his fellow crewmembers.⁹⁶ He reported seeing seven parachutes open during his rapid descent, and remarked that the bombardier was exiting the aircraft 'at the moment' the plane exploded.⁹⁷ When asked during his debriefing, 'what is [the] source's opinion as to the fate of the other crew members', my grandfather's answer revealed the hopelessness he must

⁸⁷ *E&E No. 866*, p.1.

⁸⁸ *E&E No. 866*, p.1.

⁸⁹ *E&E No. 866*, p.1.

⁹⁰ *E&E No. 866*, p.1.

⁹¹ See generally *Escape and Evasion Report No. 827, Evasion in France* (14 July 1944), available at http://media.nara.gov/nw/305270/EE-827.pdf?bcsi_scan_0F6519961A220080=0&bcsi_scan_filename=EE-827.pdf. Lt. James Cater also survived the destruction of my grandfather's aircraft over Avord, France. His personal account is recorded in *E&E No. 827*, dated July 1944. Thus, his rescue preceded that of my grandfather by approximately one month. Although these two men did not act in concert to escape German occupied France, they were both able to evade German forces by working in close coordination with *le Maquis*.

⁹² *E&E No. 827*, p.1.

⁹³ *E&E No. 827*, p.1.

⁹⁴ *E&E No. 827*, p.1.

⁹⁵ *E&E No. 827*, p.10.

⁹⁶ *E&E No. 866*, p.12.

⁹⁷ *E&E No. 866*, p.12.

have felt.⁹⁸ Lt. Murphy responded matter-of-factly that all men were ‘believed to be prisoners or dead - no one [else] contacted the resistance.’⁹⁹

While my grandfather’s predicament must have seemed quite desperate, he was fortunate to have survived such a harrowing experience. As he rightfully noted, he had not been killed during his escape nor had he been captured as a prisoner of war. Most importantly, the delayed release of his parachute had saved him from the indiscriminate machine gun fire directed at his crew while they hung defenceless from their parachutes. While such conduct on the part of German forces certainly seems less than chivalrous, it is also notable for another reason. It evidences a clear disregard for the laws and customs of war.

As a matter of course, ‘the belligerents in both World Wars accepted the 1907 [Hague] Conventions as governing their activities’.¹⁰⁰ Although Hague IV provides limited guidance related to the targeting of defenceless airmen, it is notable that the annexed Regulations make reference to the use of ‘balloons’ and ‘appliances in the air’ during times of war.¹⁰¹ Thus, while Hague IV’s provisions were intended to apply to land warfare rather than aerial warfare, one could infer that it is often quite difficult to ascertain where one type of conflict ends and the other begins. This distinction is especially complicated when discussing the duty owed to those who have successfully parachuted to the earth after their aircraft has been destroyed.

While Hague IV contains guidelines related to the treatment and care of prisoners of war,¹⁰² my grandfather’s situation was not directly analogous to that of a captured prisoner. Rather, he was a combatant who had successfully escaped his stricken aircraft and had not yet been given the opportunity to surrender. He was admittedly unarmed and was effectively incapacitated at the time of his landing.¹⁰³ Despite the fact that Germany maintained a reservation to Article 44 of the

⁹⁸ *E&E No. 866*, p.12.

⁹⁹ *E&E No. 866*, p.12. See also Claude Grimaud, *Ils Etaient Dix-Sept Mai-Juin 1944* (2011) pp.56-64. Although Lt. Murphy did not encounter any of his crewmembers in occupied France, he was mistaken when he asserted that ‘no one [else] contacted the resistance.’ Four other airmen found shelter with *le Maquis* including James Cater, Clement Dowler, Regis Carney, and Herbert Campbell. Their story was recently recounted by French historian Claude Grimaud.

¹⁰⁰ Green, *Law of Armed Conflict* p.44. See also Jochnick et al., ‘Legitimation of Violence,’ p.52.

¹⁰¹ Hague IV, arts. 29 & 53.

¹⁰² See Hague IV, Chapter II containing provisions related to prisoners of war. See also Adam Klein et al., ‘Preventive Detention in American Theory and Practice,’ *Harvard National Security Journal*, 2 (2011) 85-191, pp.85 and 96; The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, *Law of War Desktop* (2011) p.74.

¹⁰³ *E&E No. 866*, pp.1 and 10.

annexed Regulations, they were bound by all other duties imposed by Hague IV when dealing with U.S. airmen.¹⁰⁴ In particular, Article 23 imposes a specific prohibition on killing or wounding an enemy 'who, having laid down his arms, or having no longer means of defence, has surrendered at [his] discretion'.¹⁰⁵

In addition, German soldiers were constrained by the rules of customary international law articulated in the 1923 Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare.¹⁰⁶ Although these draft rules were never adopted as legally binding, 'they were regarded as an authoritative attempt to clarify and formulate rules of air warfare, and largely corresponded to [established] customary rules and general principles'.¹⁰⁷ As evidence of their applicability during World War II, 'both Axis and Allied powers proclaimed their adherence to the [Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare] and made accusations of their violation'.¹⁰⁸ Specifically, Article 20 expressly forbids the type of misconduct witnessed by my grandfather and his crew.¹⁰⁹ It states, 'when an aircraft has been disabled, the occupants when endeavoring to escape by means of parachute must not be attacked in the course of their descent'.¹¹⁰

Under the modern law of war, there is still no 'formally binding agreement which exclusively addresses air warfare'.¹¹¹ As if to emphasize the importance of the 1923 Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare, however, a number of its principles are reiterated in modern provisions of international law.¹¹² Notably, GPW formally recognizes the concept of combatant immunity¹¹³ which is further articulated in contemporary U.S. jurisprudence.¹¹⁴ In recent times, combatant immunity has come to signify 'a doctrine rooted in the customary international law of war, [which] forbids

¹⁰⁴ Roberts et al., *Documents on the Laws of War* p.84; Garner, 'German War Code,' pp.7 and 8.

¹⁰⁵ Hague IV, art. 23.

¹⁰⁶ See generally Hague Rules of Air Warfare (1923); Natalino Ronzitti et al., *The Law of Air Warfare: Contemporary Issues* (Eleven International Publishing, 2006) p.43; Richard Wyman, *The First Rules of Air Warfare* (Air Command and Staff College, 1984).

¹⁰⁷ Roberts et al., *Documents on the Laws of War* p.139.

¹⁰⁸ Roberts et al., *Documents on the Laws of War* p.140.

¹⁰⁹ Hague Rules of Air Warfare, art. 20.

¹¹⁰ Hague Rules of Air Warfare, art. 20.

¹¹¹ Roberts et al., *Documents on the Laws of War* p.141.

¹¹² Ronzitti et al., *Law of Air Warfare* pp.10, 21, 45, and 96.

¹¹³ Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (12 Aug 1949) arts. 87 & 99.

¹¹⁴ *United States v. Lindh* (2002). See also Geoffrey Corn et al., 'Two Sides of the Combatant Coin: Untangling Direct Participation in Hostilities from Belligerent Status in Non-International Armed Conflicts,' *University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law*, 33 (2011) 313-362; Major Alex Peterson, 'Order Out of Chaos: Domestic Enforcement of the Law of Internal Armed Conflict,' *Military Law Review*, 171 (2002) 1-90, pp.1 and 19.

prosecution of soldiers for their lawful belligerent acts committed during the course of armed conflicts against legitimate military targets.¹¹⁵

Furthermore AP I, which has not been adopted by the United States but has come to represent persuasive customary international law,¹¹⁶ provides unambiguous protections for escaping parachutists. Specifically, AP I forbids the targeting of a 'person parachuting from an aircraft in distress' and further requires that a downed airman 'be given an opportunity to surrender before being made the object of attack'.¹¹⁷ Thus, it is 'generally considered a rule of customary international law that an aircrew baling out of a damaged aircraft are *hors de combat* and immune from attack whether by enemy aircraft or from the ground.'¹¹⁸ In addition, once an airman reaches the ground he shall not be made the object of attack if 'he has been rendered unconscious or is otherwise incapacitated by wounds or sickness, and therefore is incapable of defending himself'.¹¹⁹

Thus, the conduct of German forces described by both my grandfather and the pilot of his B-17 constituted violations of the laws and customs of war. Despite the fact that Hague IV contained no specific prohibition on the targeting of downed airmen descending from their crippled aircraft, these actions were strictly forbidden by established customary international law. In addition, it is unclear how such behaviour could be justified under the doctrines of *Kriegsraison* or military necessity. Certainly, killing unarmed and incapacitated airmen is not indispensable for military success. Rather, it signifies a gross repudiation of the laws of war and an overall contempt for the humanitarian principles embodied in Hague IV.

¹¹⁵ United States v. Lindh (2002) p.553.

¹¹⁶ Green, *Law of Armed Conflict* p.177; Michael Matheson, Deputy Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, *Remarks at the Sixth Annual American Red Cross – Washington College of Law Conference on International Humanitarian Law: A Workshop on Customary International Law and the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions*, *American University Journal of International Law and Policy*, 2 (1987) 415-538, pp.415, 419, and 422–29. See also Michael Schmitt, 'Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements,' *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics*, 42 (2010) 697-739, pp.697 and 716-17.

¹¹⁷ Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (AP I) (1977) art. 42.

¹¹⁸ Green, *Law of Armed Conflict* p.177. See also The Judge Advocate General's School, *Air Force Operations and the Law* (2009) pp.16 and 25.

¹¹⁹ AP I, arts. 41(2)(c) & 42(1).

4 Successful Escape and Evasion

While Lt. Murphy was certainly fortunate to have escaped the fate of some of his fellow airmen at the hands of the Germans, his adventure was far from over. For the next three months he would be forced to evade capture by enemy soldiers and *la Milice Française*, local French militias loyal to occupying German forces.¹²⁰ My grandfather had been trained in escape and evasion in February of 1944 by an Intelligence Officer in England and he found the lectures to be of significant value.¹²¹ As revealed in *Escape and Evasion Report No. 866*, he took his duties very seriously. When asked about the destruction of 'secret papers and equipment', my grandfather responded in partially capitalized letters, 'I ATE them', as if to emphasize his resolve.¹²²

In order for my grandfather to escape detection by German soldiers, it was necessary for him to blend in with the civilian population. He was lucky that the Frenchmen who initially found him saw fit to place a 'woodman's jacket' over his shoulders.¹²³ Although my grandfather could barely walk because of the back injury he sustained during his landing, the jacket provided a much needed disguise.¹²⁴ He remarked:

I started S by compass. Shortly after I started out, and while I was talking to some Frenchmen, three truckloads of Germans drove by, evidently searching for me. They paid no attention to me while the Frenchmen said 'Bonjour' to them... [Subsequently] I kept well off the roads and stayed in the woods as much as possible.¹²⁵

Throughout my grandfather's escape, German soldiers were in close pursuit. He was told by resistance fighters that the 'Germans formed a circle from Avord and followed him as far as [the town of] Blet.'¹²⁶ This was a distance of nearly 20 kilometres. At one point, 'they were just three

¹²⁰ See *E&E No. 866*, p.5. See also Herbert Lottman, *The Purge: The Purification of French Collaborators After World War II* (William Morrow, 1986). While *le Maquis* was composed of rural French Resistance fighters, *la Milice Française* was a paramilitary militia loyal to the Vichy Regime. In his narrative, Lt. Murphy described how he was weary of not only traditional German forces but also French collaborators. For periods up to a week in duration, he was forced to sleep 'in the woods carefully concealed, for the Milice were raising hell in the section.'

¹²¹ *E&E No. 866*, p.19.

¹²² *E&E No. 866*, p.22.

¹²³ *E&E No. 866*, p.1.

¹²⁴ *E&E No. 866*, p.1.

¹²⁵ *E&E No. 866*, p.1.

¹²⁶ *E&E No. 866*, p.4.

or four kilometers behind; one town they entered about four hours after [he] had left it.¹²⁷ My grandfather, however, had discovered a creative means of transportation in light of his injuries. He observed that ‘bicycling seemed to be quite safe as long as one ducked for cars.’¹²⁸

Following the D-Day invasion of 6 June 1944, travel became increasingly difficult.¹²⁹ My grandfather noted that German military operations were intensifying as a result of the Allied landing, and the ‘Gestapo ran patrols on the main roads, using chiefly motor cars.’¹³⁰ In addition, the Germans did away with all ‘through trains in France’ and transportation was limited to only those rail cars running east or northeast towards the German border.¹³¹ In the meantime, however, my grandfather had been fortunate to come across a French family that put him in direct contact with *le Maquis*.¹³²

After contacting the French Resistance, Lt. Murphy was moved to the farm of a local resistance leader, Monsieur Camille Gerbeau.¹³³ At this point in his journey, my grandfather seemed less concerned with affecting his own escape and instead turned his attention towards assisting the nearly 575 men training at this ‘center of resistance activities.’¹³⁴ He was introduced to the *grand chef de resistance*, and ‘participated in the parachuting [of resistance forces] and in their radio work, decoding messages as they instructed [him].’¹³⁵

As a result of his actions, my grandfather was now acting in concert with *le Maquis* and aiding their efforts as if he was a fellow resistance fighter rather than a downed U.S. airman. He writes that he was ‘sending out regular messages’¹³⁶ to Allied forces and was also relaying information related to German ‘V-1’ and ‘V-2’ weapons.¹³⁷ When he was finally rescued by the British Royal Air Force on 5 August 1944, he was fully immersed in the culture of the resistance fighter. As

¹²⁷ *E&E No. 866*, p.1.

¹²⁸ *E&E No. 866*, p.2.

¹²⁹ *E&E No. 866*, p.2.

¹³⁰ *E&E No. 866*, p.2.

¹³¹ *E&E No. 866*, p.2.

¹³² *E&E No. 866*, p.4.

¹³³ *E&E No. 866*, p.4.

¹³⁴ *E&E No. 866*, p.5.

¹³⁵ *E&E No. 866*, p.5.

¹³⁶ *E&E No. 866*, p.5.

¹³⁷ *E&E No. 866*, p.5. See also Peter Cooksley, *Flying Bomb: The Story of Hitler's V-Weapons in World War II* (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1979); Ayres, *Bomber Boys* p.216. See also Richard Holmes, *World War II: The Definitive Visual History* (DK, 2009) p.278. The German V-Weapons, known as the V-1 flying bomb and the V-2 rocket, were pilotless, free-flight rockets developed for use against England. Notably, these weapons were largely indiscriminate and inflicted substantial casualties on Allied civilians.

evidenced in *Escape and Evasion Report No. 866*, my grandfather often used the term 'we' to describe the efforts of *le Maquis* against the occupying German forces.¹³⁸ Thus, on 4 August 1944, he recalls that 'we got our operational messages over the BBC... that night we went to the [meeting location], armed with MG's [machine guns] and psitols [sic].'¹³⁹

Finally, more than three months after his plane was shot down over Avord, Lt. Murphy's long awaited salvation arrived.¹⁴⁰ Although my grandfather returned to England on 6 August 1944 after a daring Royal Air Force rescue,¹⁴¹ the danger he faced in occupied France is even more significant when analysed from a law of war perspective. Prior to World War II, parties to a conflict presupposed that treaty obligations applied only to international armed conflicts or conflicts between states.¹⁴² Notably, Hague IV and its annexed Regulations refer exclusively to 'conflicts between nations'.¹⁴³

As demonstrated by my grandfather's narrative, however, the conflict in German occupied France was extremely complex.¹⁴⁴ It had both the characteristics of an inter-state and intra-state conflict.¹⁴⁵ While German soldiers were forced to defend against aerial bombardment from traditional military forces stationed outside of German occupied territory, internal resistance fighters such as *le Maquis* were actively challenging German control from within.¹⁴⁶

The multifaceted nature of this conflict allowed escaping combatants to more easily blend in with sympathetic members of the local French population in order to avoid capture.¹⁴⁷ Although my grandfather deliberately disguised himself in civilian clothing to avoid detection, his interactions with *le Maquis* appear to go well beyond that of a typical downed airman. As a

¹³⁸ *E&E No. 866*, p.5.

¹³⁹ *E&E No. 866*, p.5.

¹⁴⁰ *E&E No. 866*, p.5.

¹⁴¹ *E&E No. 866*, p.5.

¹⁴² Green, *Law of Armed Conflict* p.66.

¹⁴³ Hague IV, Preamble.

¹⁴⁴ See generally *E&E No. 866*, p.28.

¹⁴⁵ Sylvain Vite, 'Typology of Armed Conflicts in International Humanitarian Law: Legal Concepts and Actual Situations,' *International Review of the Red Cross*, 91 (2009) 68-94; Roy Schondorf, 'Extra-State Armed Conflicts: Is There a Need for a New Legal Regime,' *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics*, 37 (2004) 1-78, p.68; Waldemar Solf, 'The Status of Combatants in Non-International Armed Conflicts Under Domestic Law and Transnational Practice,' *American University Law Review*, 33 (1983) 53-65, pp.58-59.

¹⁴⁶ See generally *E&E No. 866*.

¹⁴⁷ See generally *E&E No. 866*. See also Childers, *Shadows of War* pp.173-198.

result, he could no longer be considered as merely an escaping combatant. Rather, his activities are more accurately described as being analogous to that of a spy or saboteur.¹⁴⁸

The term 'spy', as it is generally understood under Hague IV, refers to a person who 'collects information clandestinely behind enemy lines while wearing civilian clothing.'¹⁴⁹ Specifically, a person is considered a spy when 'he obtains or endeavors to obtain information in the zone of operations of a belligerent, with the intention of communicating it to [a] hostile party.'¹⁵⁰ While my grandfather provided valuable assistance to the French Resistance, such activities were likely conducted with substantial risk to his well-being.

Hague IV makes a clear distinction between soldiers 'carrying out their missions openly' and those seeking to conceal their identities by removing their uniforms.¹⁵¹ In addition, the 1923 Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare requires members of the crew of a military aircraft to wear a 'distinctive emblem... should they become separated from their aircraft.'¹⁵² Generally, 'any person who collects information while in uniform retains his status as a combatant... and if captured is to be treated as a prisoner of war'.¹⁵³ In contrast, spies and saboteurs do not enjoy protected status when captured by enemy forces.¹⁵⁴ Rather, they may be tried and sentenced to death for their actions.¹⁵⁵

In contemporary conflicts, AP I provides that, as a matter of customary international law, 'combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian population while they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack.'¹⁵⁶ Therefore, it would be contrary to the modern law of war for a combatant to disguise himself as a civilian while

¹⁴⁸ Radsan, 'Unresolved Equation,' pp.599-602.

¹⁴⁹ Green, *Law of Armed Conflict* p.176 citing Hague IV, art. 24.

¹⁵⁰ Hague IV, art. 29.

¹⁵¹ Hague IV, art. 29; Radsan, 'Unresolved Equation,' pp.601-02.

¹⁵² Hague Rules of Air Warfare, art. 15.

¹⁵³ Green, *Law of Armed Conflict* p.176.

¹⁵⁴ Green, *Law of Armed Conflict* p.145; Radsan, 'Unresolved Equation,' pp.1277-78.

¹⁵⁵ Hague IV, art. 30; see also *Ex parte Quirin* (1942). In this historic decision, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the jurisdiction of a military tribunal that sentenced eight German-born conspirators to death when they were captured entering the United States during World War II for the purposes of espionage and sabotage. These individuals initially wore German military uniforms. After penetrating inland, however, they buried their uniforms and disguised themselves in civilian attire. Notably, Article 30 of Hague IV requires that 'a spy taken in the act shall not be punished without previous trial.' Green further acknowledges that in modern conflicts it is widely understood that to 'punish [a spy] without a proper trial is a war crime.'

¹⁵⁶ AP I, art. 44(3).

openly taking part in hostilities. AP I recognizes, however, ‘that there are situations in armed conflicts where, owing to the nature of the hostilities an armed combatant cannot so distinguish himself’.¹⁵⁷ All that is required in these instances is that an individual ‘carry his arms openly’.¹⁵⁸ A combatant that is captured by an enemy while refusing to comply with these provisions effectively ‘forfeit[s] his right to be a prisoner of war’.¹⁵⁹

Therefore, under the law of war as it existed in 1944 and in modern treaty provisions, it is highly advisable that ‘members of the armed forces engaged in the collecting of information or sabotage in enemy-occupied territory should, whenever possible, wear [a] uniform.’¹⁶⁰ To do otherwise would run the risk of being treated as a spy if captured. Given the remainder of the discussion contained in this article, it seems likely that my grandfather would have been put to death without the benefit of a trial had he been captured while assisting *le Maquis*. In fact, Adolf Hitler had issued an order in 1942 calling for the immediate execution of Allied parachutists as a matter of military necessity.¹⁶¹ Thus, like many downed airmen and French resistance fighters who met their fate, my grandfather’s death might have served as yet another example of Germany’s violent occupation.

5 The Horrors of War and Germany’s Violent Occupation

Lt. Murphy survived the harrowing experience of parachuting from his stricken B-17 and subsequently evading capture. Specific details of his declassified account, however, reveal that he was unprepared for the horrific nature of land warfare.¹⁶² As described in the remainder of *Escape and Evasion Report No. 866*, the conduct of German soldiers was not only contrary to the law of war as it existed in the summer of 1944, it was also morally reprehensible.¹⁶³

¹⁵⁷ AP I, art. 44(3).

¹⁵⁸ AP I, art. 44(3).

¹⁵⁹ AP I, art. 44(4).

¹⁶⁰ Green, *Law of Armed Conflict* p.176.

¹⁶¹ Charlesworth, ‘2 SAS Regiment,’ p.12. Charlesworth writes that this Commando Order and subsequent Supplementary Order of the Fuhrer ‘called for all captured parachutists to be handed over . . . for disposal’. Notably, both documents cite military necessity as justification for such conduct. To view a translation of this primary source material, please see *Hitler’s Commando Order* (18 Oct 1942), available at http://www.combinedops.com/Hitlers_Commando_Order.htm.

¹⁶² See generally *E&E No. 866*.

¹⁶³ See generally *E&E No. 866*.

Within the first two days of his attempted escape, my grandfather learned that survival was going to be a daily struggle. He slept in the woods at night and nearly froze to death.¹⁶⁴ He quickly exhausted the meagre supplies in his survival pack and had no food or water.¹⁶⁵ As a result, he had to approach sympathetic civilians for assistance.¹⁶⁶ One of the few facts my father and I knew about my grandfather was that the man was a devout Catholic. Thus, it must have seemed like divine providence when in those first few days he was directed to a Catholic Priest for assistance.¹⁶⁷

Although my grandfather spoke no French, local inhabitants likely realized his religious preference from the engravings on his dog tags.¹⁶⁸ They gave him a letter and pointed him toward a nearby village.¹⁶⁹ He circled the small town at first, looking for signs of German patrols, and then proceeded directly to the church as he had been instructed.¹⁷⁰ When the Priest appeared at the door, my grandfather handed him the note and pleaded for assistance.¹⁷¹ The Priest responded almost immediately with one simple phrase - 'Au revoir'.¹⁷² Like most of the civilian population, this man of faith was likely frightened by the threat of retribution.

German forces had increased patrols because they knew 'Americans were in the region'.¹⁷³ In addition, *la Milice Française* was terrorizing the countryside at the behest of its German occupiers.¹⁷⁴ With few options, my grandfather slept on the bare earth and later concealed himself amongst horses in local stables.¹⁷⁵ He even hid in one family's 'WC', or outhouse, on 6 June 1944, the day the Normandy landings took place.¹⁷⁶ His daily existence was fraught with peril, and during this time, German soldiers monitored all radio transmissions in the region.¹⁷⁷ As a result, a number of French operatives were captured after they signalled my grandfather's

¹⁶⁴ *E&E No. 866*, p.8.

¹⁶⁵ *E&E No. 866*, p.9.

¹⁶⁶ *E&E No. 866*, p.8.

¹⁶⁷ *E&E No. 866*, p.8.

¹⁶⁸ *E&E No. 866*, p.8.

¹⁶⁹ *E&E No. 866*, p.8.

¹⁷⁰ *E&E No. 866*, pp.8-9.

¹⁷¹ *E&E No. 866*, p.9.

¹⁷² *E&E No. 866*, p.9.

¹⁷³ *E&E No. 866*, p.4.

¹⁷⁴ *E&E No. 866*, p.5.

¹⁷⁵ *E&E No. 866*, p.5.

¹⁷⁶ *E&E No. 866*, p.4.

¹⁷⁷ *E&E No. 866*, p.5.

position to Allied troops.¹⁷⁸ One man who narrowly escaped had ‘literally been beaten half to death’ during the incident.¹⁷⁹

Being taken into custody by German forces or *la Milice Française* meant certain death for many members of *le Maquis*.¹⁸⁰ While staying at Monsieur Gerbeau’s farm, my grandfather met a ‘tall very good looking young captain in the French Intelligence Service, Jean, who had arrived with a short very heavily bearded chap... having parachuted into France.’¹⁸¹ These men came to meet with the *grand chef de resistance* and assist training operations at the farm.¹⁸² Unfortunately, both men were captured and subsequently brutalized by German forces.¹⁸³ Jean, the tall good looking captain, was tortured.¹⁸⁴ His companion, the ‘bearded chap’, was summarily murdered.¹⁸⁵

Although these events are alarming, they represent only a hint of the true horror my grandfather witnessed. German soldiers throughout France used violence as a tool of occupation.¹⁸⁶ Furthermore, they were capable of far more egregious conduct than merely murdering local resistance fighters. While the deaths of members of *le Maquis* were certainly tragic, there is one particular recollection contained in *Escape and Evasion Report No. 866* that defies all explanation.¹⁸⁷ It can only be described as a grotesque and appalling perversion of war. In a handwritten note scrawled in the margin of the report, my grandfather attests to having witnessed a shameful atrocity committed against the French population.¹⁸⁸ In his own voice, he painfully recalls:

About 3 weeks ago I saw a town within 4 hours bicycle ride up the Gerbeau farm where some 500 men, women, and children had been murdered by the Germans. I saw one baby who had been crucified.¹⁸⁹

¹⁷⁸ *E&E No. 866*, p.5.

¹⁷⁹ *E&E No. 866*, p.5.

¹⁸⁰ Jackson, *Dark Years* pp.544-46. See generally Chambard, *The Maquis*.

¹⁸¹ *E&E No. 866*, p.5.

¹⁸² *E&E No. 866*, p.5.

¹⁸³ *E&E No. 866*, p.5.

¹⁸⁴ *E&E No. 866*, p.5.

¹⁸⁵ *E&E No. 866*, p.5.

¹⁸⁶ See generally Max Hastings, *Das Reich: The March of the 2nd SS Panzer Division Through France* (Holt, 1982) documenting the 2nd SS Panzer Division’s march through France to reinforce German soldiers battling the advancing American Army.

¹⁸⁷ *E&E No. 866*, p.5.

¹⁸⁸ *E&E No. 866*, p.5.

¹⁸⁹ *E&E No. 866*, p.5.

There is no question that the event described by Lt. Murphy signifies a complete abandonment of the laws and customs of war. Readers of his words, even 69 years after they were first transcribed, cannot help but succumb to the powerful and deplorable imagery they invoke. Such conduct seemingly transcends all conscionable bounds of cruelty. Furthermore, it suggests a gross repudiation of every principle of human decency. While the men who committed these crimes likely justified their behaviour under the doctrine of *Kriegsraison*, the genuine rationale behind their conduct may be far simpler to explain. German soldiers were attempting to terrorize French civilians into submission.¹⁹⁰ In effect, they were acting out of desperation as the War slowly slipped from their grasp.¹⁹¹

Despite the shocking content of this revelation, it is initially unclear whether the full significance of my grandfather's addendum was recognized by military intelligence officers overseeing his debriefing. As a practical matter, this hastily transcribed addition was not included in the final, typed version of the report.¹⁹² The officer charged with conducting my grandfather's interview also failed to record any other information related to this grisly remembrance.¹⁹³ Rather, he seemed far more concerned with discussing German tactical movements and troop concentrations - the precise type of information that escape and evasion reports were intended to collect. Thus, it seems possible this classified postscript, which was unavailable for public scrutiny, went unnoticed by the approving official and the Army chain of command due to its nearly indecipherable penmanship.

By the time this document was first declassified in 1974, nearly 30 years had passed since the end of the War and four years since my grandfather's death.¹⁹⁴ In addition, the war crime trials at Nuremberg and other related war crimes proceedings had concluded over 25 years prior. During this intervening period, my grandfather was prohibited from openly discussing the particular facts of his wartime experience because of the security certificate he signed in

¹⁹⁰ Hastings, *Das Reich* p.185 describing savage reprisals taken against civilians by the 2nd SS Panzer Division in central France.

¹⁹¹ Hastings, *Das Reich* p.185.

¹⁹² See generally *E&E No. 866*.

¹⁹³ See generally *E&E No. 866*.

¹⁹⁴ According to the National Archives and Records Administration, *E&E No. 866* was declassified under Declassification Project Number NND 745001 in 1974. Thus, the report remained classified for a period of thirty years after its initial transcription and classification. Notably, this declassified document was only recently made available to the public in electronic format on the National Archives website. E-mail from National Archives and Records Administration, on file with author (2 Jun 2011).

1944.¹⁹⁵ Moreover, it seems likely that he found it difficult to speak about such hellish recollections. In subsequently contacting members of the Murphy family, it was clear they had no knowledge of this report or the incident described therein. As a result, it has yet to be determined whether this long-faded and nearly forgotten attestation represents undiscovered evidence of a terrible criminal act perpetrated against the French population.¹⁹⁶

One can only imagine how this experience affected my grandfather, a religious man forced to observe this scene of extreme malice. These memories likely haunted him for the remainder of his life. While German soldiers had demonstrated little regard for the law of war, nothing could prepare an individual for the horrific image of a crucified child. In addition, there is no feasible justification for why these activities would have been necessary for military success. Rather, such misconduct suggests an innate contempt for all humanitarian duties imposed under international law.

This event demonstrates an absolute disregard for the 'high ideals' expressed in the Preamble to Hague IV.¹⁹⁷ Moreover, it represents multiple violations of the Articles contained in the annexed Regulations.¹⁹⁸ During World War II, there was 'no special provision in the law of armed conflict concerning the treatment of the civilian population in territory controlled by a belligerent... although atrocities against the civilian population of the adverse party would amount to war crimes.'¹⁹⁹ Rather, the duties inherent to belligerent occupation were expressed by a host of provisions in Hague IV.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁵ *E&E No. 866*, p.21.

¹⁹⁶ See Sarah Farmer, *Martyred Village* (University of California Press, 1999); Jean-Jaques Fouche, *Massacre at Oradour France, 1944: Coming to Grips with Terror* (Northern Illinois University Press, 2005); Andre Desourteaux, *Oradour/Glane: Notre Village Assassine* (Les Chemins de la Memoire, 1998). Atrocities similar to that described in *E&E No. 866* occurred in a west central French village named Oradour-sur-Glane. On 10 June 1944, a special unit of German forces indiscriminately massacred 642 men, women, and children. On 11 June, all that remained of Oradour was a smoldering mass of burnt farms, shops, and houses. The ruins of the town, sometimes referred to as *village martyr*, were left untouched after the war as a memorial to those who were murdered. It is unclear from Lt. Murphy's account whether this is the town in question.

¹⁹⁷ Green, *Law of Armed Conflict* p.41; Meron, 'Martens Clause,' p.79. See generally Downey, 'Law of War and Military Necessity,' p.251.

¹⁹⁸ See generally Hague IV.

¹⁹⁹ Green, *Law of Armed Conflict* p.256.

²⁰⁰ See generally Hague IV, Preamble & arts. 22, 25, 43, and 50.

Generally, Hague IV's annexed Regulations 'proscribe the rules of conduct and the limitations imposed upon the occupant on behalf of the inhabitants of the territory in question'.²⁰¹ Article 43 dictates that "the authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country."²⁰² Notably, the conduct described in *Escape and Evasion Report No. 866* seems to embody the antithesis of protecting public order and safety.²⁰³

The concept of distinction, which was first articulated in Article 25, requires that parties to a conflict distinguish at all times between combatants and peaceful civilians.²⁰⁴ This provision effectively precludes 'the attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are undefended.'²⁰⁵ Articles 22 and 23(e) of the annexed Regulations prohibit the infliction of 'unnecessary suffering' and 'superfluous injury' during hostilities.²⁰⁶ As noted, 'the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.'²⁰⁷ In addition, Article 50 declares that 'no general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted upon the population on account of the acts of individuals for which they cannot be regarded as jointly and severally liable.'²⁰⁸ Thus, collective punishment of the civilian population is forbidden.²⁰⁹

World War II was 'catastrophic for many civilian populations, especially those in besieged and bombarded cities, and in occupied territories.'²¹⁰ At the end of hostilities, however, 'there was broad international acceptance of the need to adopt an international agreement for the

²⁰¹ Green, *Law of Armed Conflict* p.284. For primary source material related to the American view of the Law of Occupation during World War II, see The Judge Advocate General's School, *The Law of Belligerent Occupation* (1944), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/law-of-belligerent-occupation_11.pdf.

²⁰² Hague IV, art. 43. See also Judge Advocate General, *Law of Occupation* pp.36, 38, 54, 55, and 70.

²⁰³ See generally *E&E No. 866*.

²⁰⁴ Hague IV, art. 25. For a modern discussion of the concept of distinction, see Ganesh Sitaraman, 'Counterinsurgency, the War on Terror, and the Laws of War,' *Virginia Law Review*, 95 (2009) 1745-1839, pp.1780-91; Mark Maxwell & Richard Meyer, 'The Principle of Distinction: Probing the Limits of Customariness,' *Army Lawyer* (2007) 1-11.

²⁰⁵ Hague IV, art. 25.

²⁰⁶ Hague IV, arts. 22 & 23(e).

²⁰⁷ Hague IV, art. 22.

²⁰⁸ Hague IV, art. 50. See also Judge Advocate General, *Law of Occupation* p.116.

²⁰⁹ For a discussion of the evolution of civilian immunity under Hague IV, see Richard Rosen, 'Targeting Enemy Forces in the War on Terror: Preserving Civilian Immunity,' *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law*, 42 (2009) 683-777, pp.699-702.

²¹⁰ Roberts et al., *Documents on the Laws of War* p.300.

protection of civilians'.²¹¹ As a result, GC IV was the 'first treaty devoted exclusively to the protection of civilians in time of war.'²¹² Article 3 of GC IV reemphasizes the humanitarian principles outlined in the Martens Clause when it requires that 'persons taking no active part in the hostilities... shall in all circumstances be treated humanely.'²¹³ Furthermore, Article 4 introduces the term 'protected persons' which is defined as 'those who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.'²¹⁴

In contemporary conflicts, GC IV requires that certain common protections be applied to protected persons, in particular women and children.²¹⁵ For example, 'protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manners and customs... [t]hey shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially against all acts of violence'.²¹⁶ Article 32 of GC IV also forbids 'physical suffering or extermination of protected persons... [t]his prohibition applies not only to murder, torture, corporal punishment, mutilation... but also to any other measures of brutality whether applied by civilian or military agents.'²¹⁷

In addition, GC IV's provisions have been heavily supplemented by AP I which deals with the protection of civilian persons during times of war.²¹⁸ Notably, Article 35 of AP I reiterates Hague IV's prohibition on superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering.²¹⁹ Moreover, Article 51 states that the 'civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military operations... [they] shall not be the object of attack.'²²⁰ Thus, 'acts

²¹¹ Roberts et al., *Documents on the Laws of War* p.300.

²¹² Roberts et al., *Documents on the Laws of War* p.299.

²¹³ Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949) art. 3. See also Solis, *International Humanitarian Law* pp.234-37; Michael Schmitt, 'The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities,' *Harvard National Security Journal*, 1 (2010) 5-44, pp.28 and 39.

²¹⁴ Geneva Convention IV, art. 4.

²¹⁵ Geneva Convention IV, art. 27. See also Solis, *International Humanitarian Law* p.311.

²¹⁶ Geneva Convention IV, art. 27.

²¹⁷ Geneva Convention IV, art. 32.

²¹⁸ Roberts et al., *Documents on the Laws of War* p.300. See also Solis, *International Humanitarian Law* pp.121-25.

²¹⁹ AP I, art. 35.

²²⁰ AP I, art. 51. See also Mark Maxwell, 'The Law of War and Civilians on the Battlefield: Are We Undermining Civilian Protections?,' *Military Law Review* (2004) 17-25, p.18 citing International Committee of the Red Cross, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 p.615.

or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population' are expressly prohibited.²²¹

As such, there is little question that the event described in *Escape and Evasion Report No. 866* constitutes a gross violation of both the historical and contemporary laws of war. In addition, this incident signifies a repudiation of the humanitarian principles outlined in the Preamble to Hague IV and in relevant customary international law. Despite Germany's reliance on the doctrine of *Kriegsraison*, there was no general exception to applicable treaty provisions which allowed for indiscriminate attacks and infliction of unnecessary suffering based upon military necessity.²²² Rather, the event described by my grandfather should have been characterized as an egregious war crime and punished accordingly.

Conclusion

The study of declassified intelligence has the potential to reshape modern conceptions of history. In particular, World War II era records provide valuable insight into 'aspects of German behavior, and thus of Western European culture in the first half of the twentieth century.'²²³ As German forces swept across Europe, Nazi leaders worried 'that "weaker" contemporaries and subsequent generations might not understand the "necessity" of their actions'.²²⁴ Thus, they attempted to conceal not only the corpses of their victims but also the homicidal policies underlying their wartime indiscretions.²²⁵ At the conclusion of this great conflict, thousands of war criminals escaped prosecution due in part to an 'intelligence failure' by Allied forces.²²⁶ Scholars acknowledge that 'this failure had less to do with collecting information than with recognizing its significance.'²²⁷

²²¹ AP I, art. 35.

²²² Charlesworth, 'Forgotten Justice,' p.10 theorizing that Nazi law itself 'constituted a "state of exception," thereby conferring a separate cocoon-like status upon law in Nazi Germany.'

²²³ Charlesworth, 'Forgotten Justice,' p.10.

²²⁴ Breitman et al., *U.S. Intelligence* p.3.

²²⁵ Breitman et al., *U.S. Intelligence* p.3. See also Charlesworth, 'Forgotten Justice,' p.10 explaining that Nazi rule sanctioned gross misconduct 'all the while ensuring that it was publicly unmentionable . . . The taboo was not the doing but the talking about what was done.'

²²⁶ Breitman et al., *U.S. Intelligence* p.6. See also Charlesworth, '2 SAS Regiment,' p.21. While Breitman notes the partial intelligence failure of Allied forces, Charlesworth adds that this situation was complicated by the size of the displaced population in postwar Europe. She writes, 'It has been estimated that seven million German soldiers had surrendered in the west, one and a half million German civilians had fled from the Red Army into the other occupied zones, some eight million foreign workers were displaced and ten million German urban residents had fled to the countryside.'

²²⁷ Breitman et al., *U.S. Intelligence* p.6.

Socio-legal methods have a tendency to reveal alternative viewpoints or reconstructions of historical events.²²⁸ As Salter notes, 'no single and supposedly self-sufficient academic discipline can ever be adequate to any research topic'.²²⁹ Thus, proponents of this interdisciplinary approach understand that 'history is a work in progress'.²³⁰ They appreciate that by elevating the experience of the individual above the collective, researchers are able to challenge the assumptions of traditional historians. When ordinary soldiers 'include personal comments in their correspondence, or write in pencil on the margins of reports... [t]hey are not writing diaries for posterity.'²³¹ Rather, these historical witnesses are 'writing in the moment to satisfy military requirements.'²³² As a result, their words should be afforded additional deference by virtue of their having experienced these events first-hand.²³³

Unfortunately, modern war crimes scholarship is often dominated by 'pessimism, disapproval, and critique'.²³⁴ This environment of negativity has led some to reject the study of declassified intelligence, and by implication socio-legal analysis, as a 'naive search for heroes'.²³⁵ Such academic detachment ignores 'the possibility of alternative histories... [as well as] a broader understanding and recognition of the personal roles of individuals'.²³⁶ Moreover, it marginalizes the voices of victims whose stories have yet to be told.²³⁷ Most scholars fail to understand that only by questioning established orthodoxy can we truly 'expose and destabilize claims to the authority of objectivity.'²³⁸ Thus, 'our best hope of completing this complex mosaic... are aggressive and inquisitive historians who believe that there are no real secrets'.²³⁹

Although critics of this article will contend that numerous treatises have dealt with German atrocities committed during the War, there is one important distinction that must be made. As with any historical research, it is often difficult to shift from a theoretical analysis of events to a

²²⁸ Charlesworth, 'Forgotten Justice,' p.3.

²²⁹ Salter, *Nazi War Crimes* p.3.

²³⁰ Charlesworth, 'Forgotten Justice,' p.4.

²³¹ Charlesworth, 'Forgotten Justice,' p.7.

²³² Charlesworth, 'Forgotten Justice,' p.7.

²³³ Charlesworth, 'Forgotten Justice,' p.7.

²³⁴ Charlesworth, 'Forgotten Justice,' p.7.

²³⁵ Charlesworth, 'Forgotten Justice,' p.7.

²³⁶ Charlesworth, 'Forgotten Justice,' p.8.

²³⁷ Charlesworth, 'Forgotten Justice,' p.9.

²³⁸ Charlesworth, 'Forgotten Justice,' p.4.

²³⁹ Aldrich, *Hidden Hand* p.16.

precise study of 'temporal and geographic locations'.²⁴⁰ Thus, I went to great lengths to determine the accuracy of the information contained in my grandfather's report. In October of 2011, I travelled to the Cher region of France. More importantly, I was accompanied by a remarkable historical witness, Tech Sergeant Clement Dowler, the 87 year old ball turret gunner from my grandfather's fateful flight.²⁴¹

Mr. Dowler and I saw many memorable things as we retraced my grandfather's journey south through the French cities of Avord, Bourges, Sancoins, and Sagonne. Thanks to the generosity of the French Air Force, we gazed out upon the old runway of the Avord Airbase where Mr. Dowler fractured his leg during a rough parachute landing on the afternoon of 28 April 1944. We also visited with the wonderful townspeople of the region who sheltered my grandfather and still referred to him as the '*géant américain*' due to his surprising height.²⁴² In addition, historians associated with *le Musée de la Résistance* in Bourges introduced us to extraordinary men who served with *le Maquis* during this tumultuous period in French history.²⁴³

Of particular note, not one of the individuals present - scholar, resistance fighter, or Mr. Dowler himself - could state with certainty where the dreadful event described by my grandfather occurred. In subsequent correspondence, a historian in the region, Frederic Henoff, described the difficulties he encountered during his search for related information:

Regarding your grandfather's [Escape and Evasion Report], I had also read this handwritten note. When he was hidden at Mr. Gerbeau farm [sic], at the time of the Normandy landing, a city not far from there - Saint-Amand-Montrond - was for a short time a place of fights between the French underground and the Germans... But we don't know [the whole] story, and perhaps your grandfather saw things which were forgotten then in the storm of the following fights, at the time of the liberation of the area.

²⁴⁰ Charlesworth, 'Forgotten Justice,' p.3.

²⁴¹ See generally *Escape and Evasion Report No. 1669, Evasion in France* (7 Sept 1944), <http://media.nara.gov/nw/305270/EE-1669.pdf>.

²⁴² See Laurent Boudier, *Lucy-Levis: D'Hier et D'Aujourd'Hui* (1965) p.169 explaining the general history of the region and providing specific description of Lt. Murphy's involvement with resistance efforts during the war.

²⁴³ See Natalee Seely, 'Dowler Thanks French for Saving Him: Evaded German Capture During World War II,' *Parkersburg News & Sentinel* (11 Nov 2011), <http://www.newsandsentinel.com/page/content.detail/id/554025.html> providing more information on Mr. Dowler's recent visit to France.

The scale of the carnage described in *Escape and Evasion Report No. 866* strongly suggests that my grandfather bore witness to the aftermath of the massacre at Oradour-sur-Glane.²⁴⁴ This infamous mass murder represents one of the most disgraceful wartime atrocities committed by German forces in occupied France. Moreover, he may have been recalling the fighting that took place in Saint-Amand-Montrond, or events that transpired in another nearby village, as Mr. Henoff maintains. It is clear that Lt. Murphy travelled through this region, and he likely overestimated the number of victims he observed. Nonetheless, there is one other alternative that has significant historical and moral implications - no matter how improbable it may seem, this declassified intelligence report could contain evidence of an undocumented German war crime.

Criminal acts were witnessed by many, including Mr. Dowler, during his five month escape from German occupied France. Despite this fact, the victims described in my grandfather's report are no less deserving of justice than the millions of innocents who suffered during this brutal conflict. At the conclusion of hostilities in World War II, it was widely acknowledged that the 'Germans had ill-treated and in many cases executed Allied personnel belonging to both regular and resistance forces, as well as civilians... in occupied territories.'²⁴⁵ As a result of Germany's disregard for the tenets of humanitarian law, the Nuremberg Tribunal was established pursuant to the London Charter of 1945 for the purpose of securing 'just and prompt trial and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis.'²⁴⁶

The London Charter was notable in that it first provided a clear definition of what constituted a war crime for the purpose of the ensuing proceedings.²⁴⁷ The principles established in the Charter and in the Nuremberg Tribunal's resulting judgment would come to be regarded as

²⁴⁴ For additional discussion of the massacre at Oradour-sur-Glane, see generally Farmer, *Village Martyr*. Notably, the village of Oradour is within a four hour bicycle ride of the Cher department. In addition, this is the general area where my grandfather and Tech Sergeant Clement Dowler independently participated in resistance activities from the period May through August 1944. Interview with Tech Sergeant Clement Dowler in Avord, France (12 Oct 2011).

²⁴⁵ Green, *Law of Armed Conflict* p.320.

²⁴⁶ Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal (London Charter) (8 Aug 1945) art. 1. For primary source material related to the judgment at Nuremberg, see Telford Taylor, *Final Report to the Secretary of the Army on the Nuernberg War Crimes Trials* (15 Aug 1949), http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_final-report.pdf.

²⁴⁷ Taylor, *Final Report Nuernberg* p.324. See also Theodor Meron, 'Reflections on the Prosecution of War Crimes by International Tribunals,' *American Journal of International Law*, 100 (2006) 551-579, p.562.

declaratory of the law of war.²⁴⁸ The term 'war crime' was given broad application in the proceedings and included conduct that evidenced 'violations of the laws *and customs* of war.'²⁴⁹ In addition, the Charter introduced a new subset of war crimes described as crimes against humanity.²⁵⁰ This designation included such transgressions as 'murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population'.²⁵¹

Interestingly, the Nuremberg Tribunal gave little credence to the use of military necessity as a defence to German war crimes.²⁵² Many felt that by distorting this concept, German soldiers reduced 'the entire body of the laws of war to a code of military convenience, having no further sanction than the sense of honour of the individual military commander'.²⁵³ Thus, within the guidelines set forth by the Nuremberg Tribunal, my grandfather's account unequivocally demonstrates that *Kriegsraison* is both morally reprehensible and criminal. In effect, this doctrine allows a belligerent to justify even the most abhorrent behaviour under the guise of military necessity. Consequently, it serves as nothing more than a means of enabling wartime misconduct.

While the Nuremberg Tribunal is now a fixture of the past, the majority of German war criminals were tried by national courts.²⁵⁴ This trend continues to the present day.²⁵⁵ One only has to look to the May 2011 conviction of a former guard at a Nazi concentration camp to see the utility of this forum for prosecuting war crimes which occurred many years ago.²⁵⁶ Although my initial

²⁴⁸ Green, *Law of Armed Conflict* p.320.

²⁴⁹ London Charter, art. 6 (emphasis added).

²⁵⁰ London Charter, art. 6.

²⁵¹ London Charter, art. 6.

²⁵² See generally U.N. Secretary-General, *The Charter and Judgment of the Nurnberg Trial – History and Analysis*, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/5 (1949), http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_5.pdf. See also Jochnick et al., 'Legitimation of Violence,' p.64; Schmitt, 'Military Necessity'; Downey, 'Law of War and Military Necessity.'

²⁵³ Green, *Law of Armed Conflict* p.148. See also Horton, 'Kriegsraison or Military Necessity,' pp.585-87; Solis, *International Humanitarian Law* p.266.

²⁵⁴ Roberts et al., *Documents on the Law of War* p.11; Charlesworth, 'Forgotten Justice,' pp.2-10. See also Meron, 'Reflections,' p.557; M. Cherif Bassiouni, "'The War to End all Wars" and the Birth of a Handicapped International Criminal Justice System,' *Denver Journal of International Law and Policy*, 30 (2002) 244-291, p.253.

²⁵⁵ Roberts et al., *Documents on the Law of War* p.11.

²⁵⁶ See generally Jack Ewing et al., 'Demjanjuk Convicted for Role in Nazi Death Camp,' *New York Times* (12 May 2011), <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/13/world/europe/13nazi.html>. On May 12, 2011, John Demjanjuk was found guilty by a German court of taking part in the murder of 28,000 people in 1943. He served as a guard at the Sobibor concentration camp in German occupied Poland during World War II.

intent in writing this article was to pay tribute to Lt. Murphy's bravery and sacrifice, my thoughts often turned to the innocent French civilians whose lives were extinguished in the summer of 1944. I pondered whether the perpetrators of this vicious crime were punished and whether the true extent of their acts had been exposed to the world.

As a result, my final conclusion related to *Escape and Evasion Report No. 866* is that the facts outlined in this document simply demand further scrutiny. In essence, this article is a humble appeal for renewed investigation of this historical evidence. National courts still provide a feasible venue for determining culpability should my grandfather's report lead to evidence that is more substantial in nature. Furthermore, the Nuremberg Tribunal did not place a statute of limitations on war crimes or crimes against humanity, nor should the French government.²⁵⁷

Thus, even though my grandfather passed away over 40 years ago, his story could finally bring justice for the men, women, and children who suffered unlawful deaths at the hands of their German occupiers. Although I never had the pleasure of meeting Lt. Murphy, I strongly suspect that he, and the honourable men that fought alongside him, would have wanted it that way.

After decades of legal proceedings, Demjanjuk's conviction was hailed by many as evidence of the immutability of justice.

²⁵⁷ The applicability of statutes of limitation to war crimes and crimes against humanity has been an area of debate in France. National law and subsequent decisions by the Court of Cassation seemingly indicate that war crimes prosecutions are constrained by a statute of limitations. See *Barbie Case* (1985). Nonetheless, France unequivocally supported non-applicability during debate in front of the U.N. General Assembly. See *Statement Before the U.N. General Assembly* (1967). In addition, they signed the *European Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes*. See *Signatories to the Convention* (1968).